Private Transfer Fees: Developer Exploitation or Legitimate Financing Vehicle by Ward, Burke T. & Hopkins, Jamie P.
Volume 56 Issue 5 Article 5 
2012 
Private Transfer Fees: Developer Exploitation or Legitimate 
Financing Vehicle 
Burke T. Ward 
Jamie P. Hopkins 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr 
 Part of the Civil Procedure Commons, and the Contracts Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Burke T. Ward & Jamie P. Hopkins, Private Transfer Fees: Developer Exploitation or Legitimate Financing 
Vehicle, 56 Vill. L. Rev. 901 (2012). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol56/iss5/5 
This Symposia is brought to you for free and open access by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Villanova Law Review by an authorized editor of Villanova 
University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. 
2012]
PRIVATE TRANSFER FEES: DEVELOPER EXPLOITATION OR
LEGITIMATE FINANCING VEHICLE?
BURKE T. WARD &JAMIE P. HoPKINs*
I. INTRODUCTION
IMAGINE that Mr. Smith, his wife, and two children purchase a new
home for $250,000; however, a year later, Mr. Smith is forced to relocate
his family across the country because his company is moving its operations.
Mr. Smith is forced to sell his new home quickly and when he attempts to
sell his property he is informed at the settlement proceedings that he must
pay a private transfer fee of one percent before any transfer of the prop-
erty is finalized. Now, within one year of buying his home, Mr. Smith owes
a third party $2,500 (one percent of his home's value) upon the transfer.
Mr. Smith pays the $2,500 because he must relocate immediately and has
no other options. He wonders why he never knew about the fee and why
his realtor never explained to him its existence when he originally pur-
chased the property. Mr. Smith is not alone in this predicament as more
than 11 million homes are encumbered by private transfer fee covenants.
A private transfer fee (PTF) is typically created when a developer or
homeowner decides to attach a covenant to the title of the home.' This
covenant, the PTF covenant, attaches the PTF to the real property. These
covenants require payment of a fee-typically stated as one percent of the
property's sale price-upon each resale or transfer of the property and
often survive for a period of ninety-nine years. 2 The recipients or owners
of the PTF (PTF beneficiaries) can be almost anyone, including property
developers, PTF developers, home owner associations (HOA), private in-
vestors, state governments, and non-profit charities. Usually, the PTF pay-
ment is designated to a trust in which a trustee retains a portion of the fee
for expenses and pays the remainder of the fee to the PTF beneficiaries.
* Burke T. Ward is a Professor of Business Law and Taxation at the Villanova
University School of Business and a member of the faculty at the Graduate Tax
Program. Jamie P. Hopkins, Esq. is a Pennsylvania-licensed attorney. He
graduated cum laude from the Villanova University School of Law with a J.D. in
2010, from Villanova University School of Business with an M.B.A. in 2011, and
from Davidson College with a B.A. in 2007.
1. See FREEHOLD CAPITAL PARTNERS, FILE No. 5434, DECLARATION OF COVENANT
(on file with authors) (discussing how PTFs are created by property developers via
restrictive covenants to titles of new homes in property developments).
2. See Margaret Jackson, Transfer Fees of Home Sales Under Fire, DENVER POST,
July, 30, 2010, available at http://www.denverpost.com/business/ci_15636063
(stating PTF covenants can last anywhere from one to ninety-nine years, but are
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Are PTFs a form of financial exploitation by developers or a reasonable
financing vehicle?
Proponents of PTF covenants argue that PTFs are financial instru-
ments designed to spread out housing development costs and lower the
costs of homeownership.3 Their opponents argue that PTFs lower hous-
ing values, surprise homebuyers with extra fees, create unreasonable re-
straints on alienation, and impair the marketability of title.4 PTFs can
surprise potential homebuyers even when the PTF covenant is recorded
and clearly identified; buyers often do not know that the property they are
buying has a PTF convent until the closing.
The use of PTF covenants has been regulated in thirty-six states and
federal legislation has been proposed that would all but eliminate the cre-
ation of new PTF covenants. 5 While PTFs have been banned in some
states, in a majority they remain legal and enforceable in some form.
Under existing laws, PTFs are unlikely to be an illegal restraint on aliena-
tion and should be protected by freedom of contract because the fees are
agreed upon by both parties before the sale of the property. However,
legislation is needed to ensure that potential homebuyers are aware of
PTF covenants well before the closing. Requiring timely disclosure of
PTFs would protect potential buyers and could protect PTFs from an out-
right ban through federal legislation. An outright ban on PTFs would
have negative financial consequences for HOAs, charities, and others that
commonly use and rely on transfer fees to fund their operations. Ulti-
mately, legislation is needed in order to ensure that potential homebuyers
are notified before the closing that PTFs are attached to the real property.
The recent increase of state and federal legislation aimed at regulat-
ing the widespread use of PTF covenants has put the continued use and
legality of PTFs in doubt.6 This Article examines the potential benefits
and pitfalls of regulating PTF covenants by reviewing both enacted and
proposed PTF legislation. Part II of this Article discusses the history and
3. See Aldo Svaldi, Home Fee Ban Awaits Signing, DENVER PosT, May 10, 2011, at
B5 (summarizing that proponents of PTFs have set forth argument that PTFs assist
property developers to recover their upfront infrastructure costs by spreading
these costs across multiple owners and therefore lowering the initial sales price of
the property).
4. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 39A-1 (2011) (stating purpose of act).
5. See Samantha Elliot Krepps, Private Transfer Fees Now Prohibited in PA, PA.
Ass'N OF REALTORS (June 24, 2011), http://www.parealtor.org/news/2011/06/
24/2011/private-transfer-fees-now-prohibited-in-pa/ (noting Pennsylvania is thirty-
sixth state to regulate use of PTFs).
6. See id. (declaring thirty-six states have passed legislation restricting use of
PTF covenants and that multiple other states are considering similar regulations);
Press Release, Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, FHFA Proposes Rule on Private Transfer Fee
Covenants (Feb. 1, 2011), available at http://www.fhfa.gov/webfiles/19671/Pi-
vate transfer fee_02011I.pdf (declaring FHFA proposed rule "would limit Fannie
Mae, Freddie Mac, and the Federal Home Loan Banks from dealing in mortgages
on properties encumbered by certain types of private transfer fee covenants and in
certain related securities").
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development of PTFs and their close relation to government-mandated
real estate transfer taxes. Further, Part III describes the legality of PTF
covenants under the current legal constructs of "touch and concern," re-
straint on alienability, and freedom of contract. Part IV delves into the
potential drawbacks and benefits accompanying the use of PTF covenants
in order to spread out development costs. Additionally, Part V explores
the wide array of enacted and proposed legislation designed to regulate
the use and transparency of PTF covenants. Finally, Part VI sets forth a
proposed model statute combining new elements with those of currently
enacted statutes in an attempt to develop a less restrictive ban on PTF
convents while at the same time providing the consumer protections
sought after in currently enacted statutes.
II. BACKGROUND
A. History and Development of Private Transfer Fees
Governments and HOAs have been using transfer taxes and fees for
decades in order to lower costs to homeowners and help maintain healthy
communities. 7 HOAs collect transfer fees in order to pay for community
maintenance and community services.8 Municipalities have utilized trans-
fer taxes and fees, often referred to as impact fees, in order to raise reve-
nues and recoup expenses for private development projects.9
Municipalities have imposed impact fees through the police power in or-
der to generate revenue to provide adequate public facilities such as water
and sewer lines.10 Government transfer fees and HOA dues spread out
development and maintenance costs to multiple homeowners just as PTFs
are able to spread out community development costs to multiple property
owners. Transfer fees lower the cost of property ownership by requiring
multiple subsequent owners of real property to pay a fee each time the
property is transferred, thereby spreading out development, public ser-
7. See State Real Estate Transfer Taxes, FTA BULLETIN (Fed'n of Tax Adm'rs,
Washington, D.C.), Feb. 16, 2006, at 3-5, available at http://www.taxadmin.org/
fta/rate/B-0306.pdf (listing thirty-five states and D.C., all of which impose real es-
tate transfer fees that range from .001 to 2.2% of transferred property's value).
8. SeeJason Story, Recent Development, TransferFee Covenants and Homeowner's
Associations, ILL. Bus. L.J. (Dec. 8, 2010), http://www.law.uiuc.edu/bljournal/
post/2010/12/08/Transfer-Fee-Covenants-and-Homeowners-Associations.aspx
(describing how HOAs use PTFs to fund community operations and that these fees
are not used to create profit for HOAs but are used in order to keep HOA dues
lower as dues are only paid when property is transferred and selling homeowner
receives lump sum of cash for property).
9. See Robbie Whelan, Home-Resale Fees Under Attack, WALL ST. J., July 31, 2010,
at AS (stating that municipalities have imposed transfer taxes on private property
for decades in order to raise revenues and recoup public development costs).
10. See FAQ, IMPACT FEES.COM, http://www.impactfees.com/faq/general.php#
(last visited Aug. 10, 2011) (asserting that impact fees are enforced through police
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vice, and community maintenance costs. The alternative is to have the
original buyer pay one hundred percent of the costs upfront.
While PTFs have existed for many years in the form of government
transfer taxes and HOA fees, the use of PTF covenants to create a payment
stream back to property developers or private investors is a relatively new
financial tool." PTFs frequently have been attached to new development
properties built in the past decade, especially in Texas and California. 12
The American Land Title Association has estimated that nearly 11 million
homes in the United States are encumbered by PTFs.13 From 2001 to
2006, Lennar Corporation, a California-based homebuilder, structured
PTFs into over 13,000 homes.' 4 Freehold Capital Partners (Freehold), a
New York-based PTF development firm, stated that since 2007 it has $600
billion in real estate subject to PTFs.1 5 Freehold operates by leasing PTF
agreements to developers in exchange for a percentage of the PTF.16 The
$600 billion in real estate subject to Freehold's PTFs could potentially gen-
erate the company and its partners over $60 billion over the next ninety-
nine years.17
With the use of PTF covenants becoming more commonplace in new
developments over the last decade, a strong anti-PTF movement has also
developed. Opponents have referred to PTFs as "Wall Street home resale
fees," and many consider them to be a predatory financial scheme.' 8
However, one of the first PTFs recorded was created for the Sierra Club
and the Audubon Society, for what those groups considered environmen-
11. See Whelan, supra note 9 (stating that transfer taxes have existed for long
time but that PTFs are relatively new development in real estate transaction fees).
12. See AM. LAND TITLE Ass'N, PRIVATE TRANSFER FEE COVENANTS AND THEIR
CONSEQUENCES FOR REAL PROPERwY 3-4 (2010), available at http://www.clta.org/for-
members/LegalCenter/alta TransferFeeBackground-feb2010.pdf (noting that
widespread use of PTFs originated in California and Texas but use of PTF cove-
nants has spread rapidly across country in just few years).
13. See Cmy. Ass'N INST., FOR THE COMMON GOOD: USE OF COMMUNIY TRANS-
FER FEES BY COMMUNITY ASSOCIATIONS 8 (2010), available at http://www.caionline.
org/govt/news/Political%20HeadsUp%2OPublic%2ODocument%20Library/CAI
%20Survey%2OReport%2OCommunity%2OTransfer%20Fees.pdf (reporting results
of PTF survey completed by close to 1,300 communities across country in effort to
determine effects of PTF covenants on residential properties).
14. See Whelan, supra note 9 (describing practices of Lennar Corp.).
15. See id. (detailing amount of real estate that is subject to PTFs created by
Freehold).
16. See FREEHOLD CAPITAL PARTNERS, LEARN How CAPITAL RECOVERY FEE IN-
STRUMENTS CAN HELP You 11 (n.d.), available at http://www.freeholdcapitalpart-
ners.com/forms/freehold-brochure.pdf (explaining Freehold's PTF licensing
agreements).
17. See id. at 4 (describing financial holdings). Freehold states that it holds the
rights to PTFs on over $600 billion of real estate. See id. If these PTF covenants
run for ninety-nine years at the typical one percent payment and the properties are
transferred once every seven to ten years, this would create over $60 billion in PTF
payments over the next ninety-nine years.
18. See Whelan, supra note 9 ("[Opponents] charge[] that the fees amount to
'Wall Street lining their pockets while stealing equity from homeowners.'").
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tal protections during the development of Fiddyment Farm in Roseville,
California.' 9 This PTF covenant was set up to run for twenty years and any
transfer fees paid were earmarked for the preservation of open spaces.2 0
The original agreement was made between two well-established organiza-
tions with the intention of setting up a long-term financing stream to ben-
efit their environmental projects. In addition to the Sierra Club-Audubon
Society agreement, PTFs have been used to provide financing for land
conservation, sustainable building programs, wildlife habitats, and afforda-
ble housing programs in California.21 PTF covenants have been success-
fully used to provide flexible funding options for a wide range of socially
beneficial causes. 22
B. Defining Private Transfer Fees
PTFs, also known as re-conveyance fees, capital recovery fees, Wall
Street home resale fees, private transfer taxes, and residential home trans-
fer fees, are attached to real property through PTF covenants. 23 PTF cove-
nants require payment of a fee to a third party upon each resale or
transfer of the real property. 24 PTFs are typically stated as a percentage of
the property's sales price (usually one percent) and often survive for a
19. See Lita Epstein, Real Estate Ripoffs: Private Transfer Fees Gouge New-Home Buy-
ers, AOL REAL ESTATE (Aug. 16, 2010), http://www.housingwatch.com/2010/08/
16/real-estate-ripoffs-private-transfer-fees-gouge-new-home-buyer/ ("[0]ne of the
first ones noticed was a PTF covenant created for the Sierra Club and the Audubon
Society, for environmental protections during the development of Fiddyment
Farm in Roseville, Calif."); see also CmTY. Ass'N INST., CAI TRANSFER FEE SURVEY
RESPONSE 1 (Sept. 22, 2010), available at http://www.caionline.org/govt/news/Po-
litical%20HeadsUp%2OPublic%20Document%2OLibrary/
CAI%2OTransfer%2OFee%2OSurvey%20Response.pdf (stating that many home-
owners insist that PTFs have been attached to their properties for well over
decade).
20. See Epstein, supra note 19 (detailing duration and purpose of Audubon
Society PTF covenant which was to support charitable cause of protecting environ-
ment through funding of open spaces).
21. See Letter from David L. Ledford, Senior Vice President, Nat'l Ass'n of
Home Builders, to Alfred M. Pollard, Gen. Counsel, Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency (Oct.
15, 2010), available at http://www.nahb.org/fileUpload details.aspx?contentlD=14
7200&fromGSA=1 (urging FHFA to reconsider and amend proposed PTF regula-
tions because of known, beneficial, multipurpose uses of PTFs).
22. See id. (declaring that National Association of Home Builders has received
no consumer complaints regarding such beneficial PTF covenants).
23. See Whelan, supra note 9 (listing alternative names for PTFs).
24. See Private Transfer Fee Covenants, 75 Fed. Reg. 49,932, 49,933-34 (Aug.
16, 2010), available at http://www.fhfa.gov/webfiles/16484/75-FR_49932_8-16-
2010.pdf (summarizing proposed FHFA ban on PTFs and defining PTFs).
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period of ninety-nine years.25 However, fees can be in excess of one per-
cent or stated as a specific dollar amount.2 6
PTF payments can go to a wide variety of third parties, including, but
not limited to, property developers or their trustees, HOAs, non-profits, or
community housing organizations.2 7 For example, in a commonly used
design by Freehold, the one percent fee is split between Freehold (thirty
percent), the developer/PTF-holder (sixty percent), and the trustee (ten
percent).28 This means the PTF could be divided between the developer,
trustee, collection agent, Freehold, and any other third party designated
as a recipient by the PTF covenant.29 In addition, the buyer or seller may
be required to pay the fee depending on the wording of the PTF covenant.
The seller is usually in a better position to pay since they receive cash upon
closing; hence, the seller is typically required to pay the fee.30 PTF cove-
nants are contracts agreed upon by the initial seller and buyer and are
therefore extremely flexible and can be customized to serve a variety of
purposes. 3 '
The South Carolina General Assembly proposed a bill that defined a
transfer fee covenant:
a provision in a document, whether recorded or not and however
denominated, which purports to run with the land or bind cur-
rent owners or successors in title to specified real property lo-
cated in this State, and which obligates a transferee or transferor
of all or part of the property to pay a fee or charge to a third
25. See id. at 49,933 (describing typical PTF covenant arrangement); see also
FREEHOLD CAPITAL PARTNERS, supra note 16, at 4 (explaining benefits, structure,
and development of PTF covenants under Freehold's patent pending system).
26. See Private Transfer Fee Covenants, 75 Fed. Reg. at 49,932-33 (stating that
PTFs are sometimes stated as set price and not as percentage of sales price).
27. See id. (describing potential PTF beneficiaries); see also FREEHOLD CAPITAL
PARTNERS, supra note 16, at 2 (asserting that PTF covenants are win-win situation
for developers, investors, and homeowners).
28. SeeJustin Ailes, Am. Land Title Ass'n, Public Hearing on Private Transfer
Fee Covenants (Oct. 17, 2010) (on file with authors) (detailing Freehold's PTF
covenant leasing scheme).
29. See FREEHOLD CAPITAL PARTNERS, supra note 16, at 7 (noting that real prop-
erty interest created by PTF can be split between multiple parties and sold to inves-
tors as freely assignable property rights).
30. See FREEHOLD CAPITAL PARTNERS, Common Myths About Private Transfer Fees,
PR NEWSWIRE, Aug. 28, 2010, available at http://www.prnewswire.com/news-re-
leases/common-myths-about-private-transfer-fees-101722078.html ("The fee is al-
most always paid by the seller, which means the fee is a reduction at closing. This
avoids a buyer showing up with insufficient cash to close. Transfer fees payable by
the buyer are typically very small.").
31. See Tom McPeak, The Economics of Private Transfer Fee Covenants, PR NEWS
wiRE, Apr. 22, 2010, available at http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/the-ec-
onomics-of-private-transfer-fee-covenants-91860909.html (noting that PTF cove-
nants can be extremely flexible because buyers, developers, and investors can
negotiate terms, price, and duration of PTF).
[Vol. 56: p. 901906
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person upon transfer of an interest in all or part of the property,
or in consideration for permitting this transfer.32
Furthermore, the South Carolina bill states that any fee payable on a one-
time basis that does not attempt to bind successors in title is not a PTF
under the proposed legislation.33 Instead, PTFs must be bound to the
property through a covenant and effect the transfer of the property until
the covenant runs its originally agreed upon duration. 34
C. Construction of Private Transfer Fees
As stated earlier, PTFs are attached to real property through a PTF
covenant.3 5 The PTF covenant can be a standalone document created by
a licensing company or it can be part of the original property's title docu-
ment. A PTF covenant is created when a "Declaration of Covenant" is
filed in the public records.3 6 Once the PTF covenant is recorded in the
chain of title, it runs with the real property3 7 and provides constructive
notice to all potential future buyers, title companies, and closing agents
that the property is encumbered by the PTF.3 8 Constructive notice is im-
plied by law when a document is properly recorded and open to the pub-
lic. 3 9 However, actual notice exists only when the potential buyer has
knowledge of the existence of the PTF covenant. 40 While the recordation
provides constructive notice to potential buyers, actual notice and knowl-
edge of the PTF might not occur until closing.
The PTF covenant purports to be a servitude that attaches to the real
property's title and burdens future owners from twenty to ninety-nine
32. H.R. 4808, 118th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (S.C. 2010), available at http://
www.scstatehouse.gov/sess118-2009-2010/bills/4808.htm.
33. See id. (noting that one-time transfer fees do not qualify as PTFs under
statute because they fail to burden future owners).
34. See id. (discussing duration of PTFs).
35. See McPeak, supra note 31 (describing PTFs).
36. See Letter from Micah S. Green, Patton Boggs LLP, on behalf of Freehold
Capital Partners, to Alfred M. Pollard, Gen. Counsel, Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency (Oct.
15, 2010), available at http://www.fhfa.gov/webfiles/19294/2521-PattonBoggs-
LLCon_behalf of FreeholdCapitalPartners.pdf (stating PTF covenants are cre-
ated by filing Declaration of Covenant in public records).
37. See Marjorie Ramseyer Bardwell & James Geoffrey Durham, Transfer Fee
Rights: Is the Lure of Sharing in Future Appreciation a Flawed Concept?, PROB. & PROP.,
May/June 2007, at 24, 25-28 (describing how PTF covenants run with property
after being attached to chain of title).
38. See Letter from Micah S. Green to Alfred M. Pollard, supra note 36, at 9
(stating that public recordation of PTF covenants provides constructive notice to
all potential buyers).
39. See Westland Oil Dev. Corp. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 637 S.W.2d 903, 911 (Tex.
1982) (Wallace, J., dissenting) ("Constructive notice is implied by law, from duly
recorded instruments or from the possession of land.").
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years, or even into perpetuity. 4 1 PTF covenants are considered restrictive
servitudes because their burdens purport to run with the land. 42 Depend-
ing on the jurisdiction, rules will vary when determining if a servitude is
valid and if it can run with the land.4 3
As with any type of encumbrance, PTFs are filed in the public record
as a Declaration of Covenant." The PTF is usually listed in a document
entitled "Payment of Transfer Fee Required."45 Opponents have claimed
that PTFs are often buried within paperwork and surprise potential
homebuyers with extra fees. In response to this criticism, Freehold-cur-
rently the largest PTF developer-entered into a written contract with Fi-
delity National Title Group-who handles sixty percent of the U.S. title
insurance market-to voluntarily provide a standalone document disclos-
ing the existence of any Freehold-owned PTF covenants at closing.4 6 This
voluntary disclosure mirrors the required PTF disclosure form in Califor-
nia Civil Code sections 1098 to 1099.47
Generally, potential buyers will be informed about PTF covenants
upon closing. 48 For example, all Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac loans re-
quire title insurance, and therefore a title search. 49 During a title search,
all title search companies acting with due diligence should find PTF cove-
nants the same way in which they would find any other encumbrance or
covenant.5 0 PTFs typically appear in the same manner as other common
41. See Bardwell & Durham, supra note 37 (asserting that PTFs may burden
property for up to ninety-nine years).
42. See Rjon Robbins, Private Transfer Fee Covenants: An Overview of the Three
Applicable Servitude Regimes, STREET, Mar. 5, 2010, http://www.thestreet.com/story/
10696766/1 /private-transfer-fee-covenants-an-overview-of-the-three-applicable-ser-
vitude-regimes.html (detailing why PTF covenant is considered servitude).
43. See id. (indicating that different jurisdictions apply different rules to legal-
ity of servitudes).
44. See Letter from Micah S. Green to Alfred M. Pollard, supra note 36 (stating
that PTFs are recorded as Declaration of Covenant).
45. See id. (noting that PTF covenants are often entitled "Payment of Transfer
Fee Required" in order to give notice to potential buyers, creditors, investors, and
other interested third parties).
46. See FREEHOLD CAPITAL PARTNERS, Freehold Capital Partners Enters Agreement
with Fidelity Title to Ensure Private Transfer Fee Disclosure, PR NEwSWIRE, Oct. 8, 2010,
available at http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/freehold-capital-partners-
enters-agreement-with-fidelity-title-to-ensure-private-transfer-fee-disclosure-
104588454.html (announcing that Freehold will voluntarily disclose its PTF cove-
nants to all interested parties upon closing in order to increase PTF covenant
transparency).
47. See CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1098-99 (West 2011) (outlining California law re-
garding PTFs).
48. See Letter from Micah S. Green to Alfred M. Pollard, supra note 36
(describing disclosure of PTFs).
49. See id. (explaining that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac require title searches
for all of their mortgages that should uncover any recorded PTF covenants at-
tached to property).
50. See id. at 9 (stating that title insurance companies will find recorded PTF
covenants during reasonable search).
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encumbrances-such as deed restrictions-in the Schedule B of the title
commitment.5 1 Schedule B of the title commitment lists the specific ex-
ceptions from coverage that the title company discovered during its title
search.52 It also generally includes certain standard exceptions such as
mineral and water rights. 5 3 The title insurance policy will not insure
against any financial loss resulting from title problems listed in the Sched-
ule B exceptions.54
While all buyers should know about the PTF upon closing, because it
must be recorded with the title in order to be enforceable, there have
been instances where buyers did not know about the PTF until they at-
tempted to resell their property.55 However, even if a buyer first finds out
about the PTF upon closing, this can still be an unwanted surprise late in
the real estate transaction. The buyer may have already put significant
time, effort, and money into the closing process only to find out that the
land or home is encumbered by a PTF covenant. Since the PTF was not
disclosed earlier, the buyer might have difficulty negotiating down the
price to accurately reflect the PTF. In addition, if the buyer used an ap-
praiser to determine the value of the property, it is unlikely that the ap-
praiser knew of the PTF and therefore did not accurately appraise the
property's value.56 Ultimately, the buyer may suffer significant financial
losses if the PTF is only first disclosed to the buyer at closing.
Potential homebuyers should receive actual notice and knowledge of
PTFs well before closing. In Easton v. Strassburger,5 7 a non-PTF case, a Cali-
51. See K. Michelle Lind, The Importance of Reviewing the Title Commitment, ARiz.
Ass'N OF REALTORS (Dec. 2004), http://www.aaronline.com/documents/Titlelns.
aspx (noting PTFs are found in Schedule B of title commitment, which discloses
potential important legal restrictions on property such as easements, liens, foreclo-
sures, judgments, court orders, and other legal concerns).
52. See id. (detailing contents of Schedule B title commitment list).
53. See id. (stating that Schedule B title commitment list typically includes cer-
tain standard exceptions such as mineral and water rights).
54. See id. ("The title insurance policy will not insure against loss, nor will the
title insurer pay costs, attorney fees, or expenses, resulting from title problems
listed in Schedule B.").
55. See Kenneth R. Hamey, A New Real Estate Cost to Watch For: Developer's Pri-
vate Transfer Fee, WASH. POST, Mar. 6, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/03/04/AR2010030405416.html (stating that many
PTFs were attached to homes before states had any restrictions on fees and that
buyers have purchased homes without being aware that fee even exists).
56. See Mike Unger, Private Transfer Fees Catch Home Sellers by Surprise, WASH.
EXAM'R, Sept. 21, 2010, http://washingtonexaminer.com/news/business/private-
transfer-fees-catch-home-sellers-surprise (asserting that appraisers might have diffi-
culty appraising properties with PTF covenants). "'An appraiser isn't going to
know that a private transfer fee is attached to a property, so they might not be able
to accurately give the value of a house because the price initially is artificially
brought down to pay for this fee.'" Id. (quoting director of communications for
the American Land Title Association); see also FREEHOLD CAPITAL PARTNERS, supra
note 16, at 3 (indicating that one percent PTFs reduce the purchase price of prop-
erty by two percent).
57. 199 Cal, Rptr. 383 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
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fornia court held a real estate broker liable for negligence when the real
estate broker failed to disclose all material facts that may have affected the
value or desirability of the property to potential buyers.58 PTFs are likely
to be material to the real estate transaction because they impact the real
property's value and should be disclosed to potential buyers early in the
transaction.
While the typical PTF is one percent of the purchase price, it can be
negotiated by the original developer and the original buyer.5 9 The one
percent fee is paid by each subsequent property owner upon each transfer
of the property.60 Typically, the fee is divided among the original devel-
oper, a trustee, the company that developed the PTF documentation, and
sometimes agents, brokers, or other professionals associated with the
sale.61 If the PTF is not paid upon the sale, a lien may be established on
the property for the unpaid amount.62 A lien is a claim against the prop-
erty for payment of the PTF, and a lien against the property gives the
owner of the PTF (the creditor) security that the fee will be paid.63 The
property cannot be sold or declared marketable until this lien is paid. 64
Liens can cause problems for homeowners and lenders because the
property will be unmarketable until the lien is paid, and the property can-
not be sold or refinanced until the lien is satisfied.65 Potential PTF liens
present problems for lenders because lenders typically want to be certain
that they have first-lien priority in the case of a default. 66 However, the
PTF lien holder may have first priority as a creditor, which would remove
58. See id. at 390 ("[T] he duty of a real estate broker, representing the seller,
to disclose facts . . . includes the affirmative duty to conduct a reasonably compe-
tent and diligent inspection of the residential property listed for sale and to dis-
close to prospective purchasers all facts materially affecting the value or desirability
of the property that such an investigation would reveal.").
59. See R. Wilson Freyermuth, Putting the Brakes on Private Transfer Fee Cove-
nants, PROB. & PROP.,July/Aug. 2010, at 20, 22 (discussing arguments made by PTF
proponents that these fees are valid under freedom of contract principles, partly
because parties can negotiate their own economic arrangements and trade-offs).
60. See id. at 21 ("[T]he declaration also imposes a 1% fee on the seller at the
time of each subsequent resale of the parcel during the 99-year term.").
61. See id. (explaining how PTF payment may be divided and owned by multi-
ple third parties).
62. See Am. LAND TITLE Ass'N, supra note 12, at 3 (stating that unpaid PTFs
create liens on real property that make it difficult for homeowners to transfer
property).
63. See Ailes, supra note 28 (discussing how liens provide financial security to
PTF beneficiary).
64. See AM. LAND TITLE Ass'N, supra note 12, at 3 (stating that real property
encumbered by unpaid lien can remain unmarketable until lien is satisfied).
65. See Ailes, supra note 28 (stating that unmarketable property often cannot
be sold or refinanced); see also CmTY. Ass'N INsT., supra note 13, at 3 (reporting that
only one percent of survey respondents reported PTF covenants holding up real
estate transfer); Pollard, supra note 21, at 3 (stating that NHBA had no reports of
PTF covenants causing any marketability or mortgage problems).
66. See Ailes, supra note 28 (discussing how lenders prefer to have first-lien
priority in case of payment default).
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the first priority assurance that most lenders seek.6 7 By making lenders
less secure, PTFs increase the risk lenders take on when approving mort-
gages. This heightened risk can increase costs for both the lender and the
homeowner.
PTFs can limit the ability of a homeowner to obtain financing on a
property encumbered by a PTF covenant because lenders fear losing first-
lien priority.68 In addition, some lenders have refused to extend financ-
ing to transactions involving PTFs because PTFs are not recognized as a
standard title exception by most lenders.6 9 Lenders have also refused to
loan money for transactions involving PTFs when the PTFs were only used
as a financial tool to generate money for disinterested third parties. 70
Because PTFs are usually set up to run for twenty to ninety-nine years,
the fee is typically paid to a trustee or collection agent, who enforces the
PTF, receives payment, collects the fee, and then distributes the remaining
amount to the PTF beneficiary.7 ' While some PTFs have been imposed
for the benefit of non-profits into perpetuity, PTFs cannot be imposed on
homeowners into perpetuity.7 2 Further, a PTF is a property interest, and
as such is assignable. Thus, any party that owns some of the property inter-
est should be able to enforce and freely assign the PTF.
III. LEGALITY OF PTFs
A. Private Transfer Fees Are Not an Unreasonable Restraint on Alienation
The widespread use of PTFs is a relatively new development and it is
uncertain if courts will uphold their legality. PTFs have been attacked as
an attempt to create a new property right not recognized by traditional
common law, as an impermissible restraint on alienation, and as an unen-
forceable servitude.7 3 Traditionally, courts have invalidated attempts to
67. See id. (indicating that properly and timely recorded PTF may provide
first-lien priority over other lenders).
68. See id. (stating financing for homeowners can be limited when financial
institutions would not have first-lien priority); see also Tom Larson, Private Transfer
Fees: Coming Soon to a Real Estate Market Near You?, Wis. REAL ESTATE MAG., Oct.
2010, at 27, available at http://news.wra.org/story.asp?a=1373 (arguing that PTFs
can limit ability of homeowners to obtain financing because PTFs are not consid-
ered acceptable title exceptions by all lenders).
69. See Larson, supra note 68, at 27 (describing why some lenders have refused
to finance transactions involving PTFs).
70. See id. (asserting that some lenders have declined financing properties en-
cumbered by PTF covenants because PTFs may benefit third party not involved in
transaction).
71. See FREEHOLD CAPITAL PARTNERS, supra note 16, at 5 (declaring that PTFs
are often paid to trustees, who then collect fees and distribute remaining amounts
to beneficiaries).
72. See id. (asserting that PTFs can only be created to last for ninety-nine years
and cannot be imposed onto homeowners into perpetuity).
73. See Bardwell & Durham, supra note 37, at 28-29 (articulating multiple po-
tential legal avenues to attack PTFs); Larson, supra note 68 (stating that PTF cove-
nants may result in increased litigation based on fraud and nondisclosure).
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create new forms of property ownership. 74 However, requiring PTFs is not
an entirely new concept as they have existed for decades as HOA fees.7 5
Multiple states have passed legislation prohibiting the use of PTFs
based on the public policy concern that PTFs create an unreasonable re-
straint on alienation.76 Courts attempt to protect the free alienability of
fee simple property by invalidating impermissible restraints on the free
alienation of the property.7 7 The Restatement (Third) of Property states
that any "servitude that imposes a direct restraint on alienation of the bur-
dened estate is invalid if the restraint is unreasonable."78 The reasonable-
ness of a servitude is measured by weighing the benefit of the servitude
against the burden of the restraint.7 9
Opponents argue that PTFs are unreasonable because the burden of
enforcing a PTF outweighs its benefit. Under the right conditions, a PTF
covenant could create an impermissible restraint on alienation.a0 For ex-
ample, in 1852, the New York Court of Appeals, in De Peyster v. Michael,8 1
held that a transfer fee of twenty-five percent was overly burdensome and
an illegal restraint on alienation. The typical PTF is as little as one percent
of the sale price82 and not anywhere near the twenty-five percent reserved
in De Peyster. However, because PTFs can bind a property for ninety-nine
years, the homeowner would not be able to sell the property without pay-
ing the one percent fee during his or her life.8 3
74. SeeJohnson v. Whiton, 34 N.E. 542, 542 (Mass. 1893) (indicating that courts
will not allow people to create new types of property rights). "A man cannot create
a new kind of inheritance." Id.
75. See FREEHOLD CAPITAL PARTNERS, supra note 16, at 4 (noting that other
asset-backed investments have existed for institutional investors in past, including
mortgage-backed securities).
76. See New Developments in Real Estate Transfer Fees, ISSUE UPDATE (Nat'l Ass'n
of Home Builders, Washington, D.C.), Sept. 9, 2010 (on file with authors) (noting
that several states have banned use of PTFs due to public policy); see also FLA. STAT.§ 689.28 (2008) (stating that PTFs are counter to public policy because they create
title defects and unreasonable restraints on alienation of real property); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 58-3822 (2009) (declaring any PTF, as defined by statute, void and unen-
forceable as against public policy).
77. See Bardwell & Durham, supra note 37, at 28 (stating that U.S. court sys-
tem works to protect fee simple estates from title defects and unreasonable re-
straints on alienation).
78. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 3.4 (2000).
79. See id. (noting that to measure reasonableness of servitude, restraint's util-
ity should be compared to side effects).
80. See Bardwell & Durham, supra note 37, at 28 (noting that some extreme
transfer fee requirements could constitute restraints on alienation).
81. See De Peyster v. Michael, 6 N.Y. 467, 495 (1852) ("There is, however,
abundant authority to show that conditions that the grantee shall not alien without
paying a sum of money therefor, are unlawful restraints on alienation, and there-
fore void.").
82. See Bardwell & Durham, supra note 37, at 28 (stating that PTF covenants
typically require payment equal to at least one percent of sales price).
83. See id. at 25 ("This agreement purports to be a servitude that attaches to
the title to the land and burdens future owners for 99 years.").
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Covenants that require one percent PTFs are not likely to create an
unreasonable restraint on alienation.8 4 As long as the PTF is rationally
justified and recorded, the PTF does not create an undue burden on alien-
ation.8 5 This is so because the covenants are recorded and the buyer can
therefore adjust the offer price to take into account the PTF payment that
the buyer will be obligated to make upon a future transfer of the prop-
erty.8 6 PTFs have a rational justification because they benefit both the
initial buyer and developer.8 7 The initial buyer is able to buy the real
estate at a lower price because the PTF should reduce the selling price of
the property if the buyer is aware of the back-end cost of paying the PTF
upon any future transfer.88 In addition, developers benefit from PTFs be-
cause the real property interest created provides the developer with a
long-term income stream and increased liquidity.89 Because the PTF is a
real property interest, it is freely assignable by the owner and can be sold
for present value to acquire cash. PTF covenants are not an illegal re-
straint on alienation because they do not create an undue burden on
alienation and are rationally justified.9 0
Courts applying the common law of servitudes to PTFs could find that
the covenant is an unenforceable agreement. 1 PTFs do not dissolve after
the sale of the property but rather they continue to bind the new owner
for the duration agreed upon in the original PTF covenant.9 2 For PTFs to
successfully run with the land, the covenant must satisfy the legal require-
ments of a servitude.93 A legally enforceable servitude contract requires:
(1) intent for the servitude to run; (2) the establishment of privity of es-
84. See McPeak, supra note 31 (discussing multiple benefits that PTFs provide
both developers and home purchasers).
85. See id. (noting multiple virtues of PTFs).
86. See Freyermuth, supra note 59, at 22 (noting as counterpoint to article's
thesis that if buyers have notice of PTF covenant, they will adjust their offer to
reflect future payment).
87. See id. (arguing as counterpoint to article's thesis that PTFs benefit buyer
by lowering property's price and developer by providing long-term income
stream).
88. See id. (stating as counterpoint to article's thesis that backend payment of
PTF will cause buyers to pay less for property).
89. See id. (detailing as counterpoint to article's thesis how PTFs benefit devel-
opers by making housing more affordable, creating long-term income stream, and
increasing liquidity of housing developments); see also FREEHOLD CAPITAL PART-
NERS, supra note 16, at 3 (asserting that developers and property owners benefit
from spreading out development costs through PTF covenants).
90. See FREEHOLD CAPITAL PARTNERS, supra note 16, at 3 (explaining that PTF
covenants are rationally justified because they benefit developer, property owner,
and potential future owners).
91. See Bardwell & Durham, supra note 37, at 29 (articulating common law of
servitudes).
92. See Freyermuth, supra note 59, at 25 (recounting that PTFs purport to run
with land and bind subsequent owners of property).
93. See Bardwell & Durham, supra note 37, at 29 (asserting that in some
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tate or notice; and (3) that the servitude "touch and concern" the land.9 4
The first two requirements are satisfied when a PTF covenant specifically
states that it is intended to bind each transferor of the real property for a
specific duration of time and is properly recorded.
Under traditional common law rules, the burden of a covenant would
only run with the land if the benefit and burden of the covenant touched
and concerned the land.9 5 Several courts have noted that the touch-and-
concern requirement cannot be summed up in one simple sentence or
test.9 6 In addition, a covenant need not have a physical effect on the land
to meet the requirement.9 7 However, courts have typically found that a
restrictive covenant touches and concerns the burdened estate when it "re-
stricts the owner's use and enjoyment of the property and thus affects the
value of the property."9 8 While PTFs are unlikely to have a physical effect
on the land, they should affect the property's value and restrict the
owner's use of the property if the owner is unable to sell the property for
its full value or refinance because of the PTF.
Many courts no longer rigidly enforce the touch-and-concern require-
ment and often find that servitudes touch and concern the land. For ex-
ample, the court in Candlewood Lake Ass'n v. Scott 9 found that an HOA fee
touched and concerned the land and, therefore, was a valid servitude that
bound subsequent owners.10 0 Furthermore, the Restatement (Third) of
Property abandoned the touch-and-concern requirement and instead
stated that the burden of a servitude would not run if it was "'arbitrary,
spiteful, capricious,"' or imposed an "'unreasonable restraint on aliena-
94. See id. (listing common law of servitudes requirements).
95. See Freyermuth, supra note 59, at 21-22 (describing touch-and-concern re-
quirement of servitudes).
96. See Runyon v. Paley, 416 S.E.2d 177, 183 (N.C. 1992) (asserting that touch-
and-concern requirement cannot be reduced to absolute test or definition); see also
Neponsit Prop. Owners Ass'n v. Emigrant Indus. Say. Bank, 15 N.E.2d 793, 795-96
(N.Y. 1938) (holding valid and enforceable liens based on covenants because all
three requirements to run with land and bind subsequent owners of property were
satisfied).
97. See Runyon, 416 S.E.2d at 183 (stating that touch-and-concern require-
ment need not have physical effect on property); Flying Diamond Oil Corp. v.
Newton Sheep Co., 776 P.2d 618, 624 (Utah 1989) (explaining that touch-and-
concern requirement may be satisfied without physical effect and touching on real
property). "That does not mean, however, that the covenant must have a physical
effect on the land." Flying Diamond Oil, 776 P.2d at 624.
98. See Runyon, 416 S.E.2d at 183 ("As recognized by some courts, a restriction
limiting the use of land clearly touches and concerns the estate burdened with the
covenant because it restricts the owner's use and enjoyment of the property and
thus affects the value of the property."); see also Net Realty Holding Trust v. Franco-
nia Props., 544 F. Supp. 759, 762 (E.D. Va. 1982) (asserting that limiting use of real
property clearly touches and concerns property).
99. No. O1AP-631, 2001 WL 1654288 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 27, 2001).
100. See id. at *8 (holding that deed restrictions placed on real property such
as maintenance, water, and sewage fees were found valid and could run with land
by binding subsequent property owners).
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tion."' 0 1 While the touch-and-concern requirement is still good law, it is
unlikely that a PTF covenant failing to satisfy it would be invalidated.
B. Freedom of Contract Still Applies
A strong argument in favor of protecting PTF covenants is freedom of
contract. All PTF covenants are recorded and therefore put potential buy-
ers on constructive notice of the agreement. Each buyer willingly agrees
to buy the property knowing, at least constructively, about the existence of
the PTF, and should negotiate the price accordingly.10 2 Potential buyers
are able to shop around for houses and are not forced into buying only
houses with PTF covenants, but rather have the option to purchase houses
with or without the covenants.
The Restatement of Property offers strong freedom of contract rheto-
ric in favor of protecting PTF agreements.10 3 A comment to section 3.5 of
the Restatement (Third) of Property states:
Many economic arrangements for spreading the purchase price
of property over time and for allocating risk and sharing profit
from property development can be attacked as indirect restraints
on alienation. If such arrangements are not unconscionable and
do not otherwise violate public policy, there is usually no reason
to deny the parties freedom of contract. The parties are usually
in a better position than judges to decide the economic trade-offs
that will enable a transaction to go forward and enhance their
overall value. The fact that the value that may be realized from a
parcel of land that is part of a larger arrangement has been re-
duced does not justify legal intervention to nullify part or all of
the agreed-on arrangement.10 4
As long as PTFs are not an illegal restraint on alienation, it is unlikely that
they violate any public policies, and should be allowed under freedom of
contract. Courts should not interfere and second-guess every business and
contract decision. PTF covenants are agreements between two parties on
how to pay for property development costs and these parties should be
101. See Freyermuth, supra note 59, at 22 (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
PROP.: SERVITUDES §§ 3.1 (1), (3)-(5) (2000)) (describing requirements set forth in
Restatement (Third) of Property surrounding abandonment of touch-and-concern
requirement for servitudes).
102. See FREEHOLD CAPITAL PARTNERS, supra note 16, at 11 (stating that buyers
will adjust their offers for properties accordingly because PTF covenants are re-
corded and put buyers on notice and therefore costs associated with purchasing
property will not increase).
103. See Freyermuth, supra note 59, at 22 (stating strong freedom of contract
rhetoric in Restatement (Third) of Property supports creation and legality of PTF
covenants).
104. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 3.5 cmt. a (2000) (arguing
that individual parties are better able to determine economic trade-offs than
judges and that these contracts should be left to individual parties to create).
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entitled to freedom of contract in order to determine how they will pay for
the property. 0 5 All potential buyers are able to accept or reject the PTF
agreement by purchasing or refusing to purchase the property. 0 6 How-
ever, a potential buyer needs actual notice and knowledge of the PTF in
order to make an informed purchase.' 0 7 If the buyer is informed of the
PTF late in the process-for example, at the closing-the buyer is at a
disadvantage because he or she has already invested time and money, and
has become contractually obligated, without actual knowledge of a poten-
tially burdensome PTF.
IV. BENEFITS AND BURDENS OF PTF COVENANTS
A. Who is Concerned with PTF Covenants?
Freehold claims that PTF covenants are a "win-win" for all parties.' 0 8
However, the benefits and disadvantages of PTF covenants do not identi-
cally impact all interested parties. Property developers, trustees, home-
owners, and PTF covenant developers (e.g., Freehold) argue that PTF
covenants produce such benefits as lower home costs, lower mortgage pay-
ments, increased liquidity for developers, financial flexibility, investment
opportunities, and cost-spreading options. 109 Opponents of PTF cove-
nants, including the Coalition to Stop Wall Street Home Resale Fees,"i 0
realtors, state governments, and federal housing agencies, argue PTF cove-
nants create uncertainty in the housing market, lower property values, in-
crease costs, and violate public policy.III
Certain benefits argued by PTF proponents are also argued as disad-
vantages by opponents.' 12 One example is whether decreased property
105. See McPeak, supra note 31 (indicating PTFs are used to spread out devel-
opment costs and are entered into between two willing parties).
106. See id. (stating PTFs are willingly assumed by parties who negotiate price
and contract for their own benefit).
107. See id. (indicating potential buyer needs notice of PTF in order to in-
clude all possible variables into their decision-making process when negotiating
price for PTF-encumbered property).
108. See FREEHOLD CAPITAL PARTNERs, supra note 16, at 5 (stating that PTF
covenants provide win-win scenario for all interested parties).
109. See id. (describing potential financial benefits provided by PTF covenants
to developers, trustees, investors, and homeowners).
110. See About, COAL. TO STOP WALL ST. HOME RESALE FEES, http://www.stop
homeresalefees.org/about (last visited Sept. 18, 2011). The coalition's members
consist of a variety of real estate groups and associations such as the National Asso-
ciation of Realtors and American Land Title Association. See id.
111. See The Issue, COAL. TO STOP WALL ST. HOME RESALE FEES, http://www.
stophomeresalefees.org/issue (last visited Aug. 11, 2011) (stating PTFs hurt home-
owners by lowering property values); see also Private Transfer Fee Covenants, 75
Fed. Reg. 49,932, 49,932 (Aug. 16, 2010) (indicating that PTFs damage housing
market by increasing total costs of homeownership); Krepps, supra note 5 (arguing
PTFs hurt housing market and potential homeowners by making property trans-
fers increasingly difficult).
112. See Krepps, supra note 5 (arguing PTFs harm potential homeowners).
But see FREEHOLD CAPITAL PARTNERS, supfa note 16, at 5 (arguing lowered housing
916 [Vol. 56: p. 901
16
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 56, Iss. 5 [2012], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol56/iss5/5
2012] PTFs: EXPLOITATION OR FINANCING VEHICLE?
values are a benefit or burden caused by PTF covenants. Lower initial
property values would be a benefit for potential homeowners because they
would pay less upfront, have lower mortgage payments, need to borrow
less money, and could pay less in taxes on the property.' 13 However, real-
tors and state governments would collect less revenue because realtor fees
and taxes are typically based off of a percentage of the selling price of the
property.' 1 4 This provides a financial incentive for state governments and
realtors to oppose PTF covenants that would lower real property values.
Not unsurprisingly, it has been realtors and not individual home owners
who have been the major drivers behind the increased state regulation of
PTF covenants.11 5
B. Do PTF Covenants Lower Ownership Costs?
PTFs were originally called capital recovery fees because they were
designed to spread out community development costs. By requiring pay-
ment of a fee to the original land developer each time a piece of real
property is transferred, the development costs of the property are spread
out to the multiple buyers of the real property.' 16 In a real property trans-
action without a PTF covenant, the developer must put one hundred per-
cent of its costs onto the first buyer because the developer will have no
additional income after the first sale. However, with a PTF, the developer
is able to sell the property for a lower price to the initial buyer because the
developer will be entitled to a future income stream from subsequent
transfers of the property. PTFs create a long-term income stream for the
developer, segregate the income stream from the property, and lower the
sales price of the property."' 7 The sales price of the property should be
prices are beneficial for homeowners because they make housing more affordable
by lowering costs associated with buying home).
113. See FREEHOLD CAPITAL PARTNERs, supra note 16, at 4 (stating benefits pro-
vided to homeowners by PTF covenants).
114. See Freyermuth, supra note 59, at 22-23 (explaining that lower property
values correlate to lower tax revenue generated by government).
115. See NAR Hails Proposal to Restrict GSE Mortgages with Private Transfer Fees,
NAT'L Ass'N OF REALTORS (Aug. 13, 2010), http://www.realtor.org/press room/
news-releases/2010/08/gse-mortgages ("'NAR is the leading advocate for private
property rights and housing issues and we firmly believe that private transfer fees
add an unnecessary burden to the real estate transaction and can delay a closing or
even kill the transaction. There is no service performed for such fees and they add
nothing to the value of a property . . . ." (quoting NAR president Vicki Cox
Golder)); see also CM-ry. Ass'N INST., supra note 13, at 3 (noting that less than one
percent of real estate transactions with PTF covenants are lost because of PTF cove-
nants); Svaldi, supra note 3 (noting that some legislatures have had trouble push-
ing through restrictive PTF legislation because there have been very few
constituent complaints regarding PTF covenants).
116. See FREEHOLD CAPITAL PARTNERS, supra note 16, at 3 ("[A] buyer will al-
ways pay less for property encumbered by a 1% fee than for the same property
without the fee.").
117. See id. (stating that PTF covenants lower property prices by spreading out
costs to multiple subsequent owners).
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lower for the initial buyer and any buyer subsequently affected by the PTF
because they will be obliged to pay one percent of the sale price when they
transfer the property in the future. Freehold states that a PTF should cre-
ate a one to two percent price deduction in offer prices.1 1 8
As long as PTFs are timely and fully disclosed to potential buyers, the
market will adjust to the fee and the property's price will be lower.1 1 9
However, the price may not be lower if potential buyers do not find out
about the PTF until after signing the sales contract, or even as late as the
closing. Conversely, if the PTF is fully disclosed to potential buyers, the
PTF will then spread out the development costs of the property to all sub-
sequent owners of the property for the life of the PTF covenant. By forc-
ing the initial selling price down, PTF covenants result in more affordable
housing for buyers by making the down payment, mortgage, and monthly
payments smaller. In addition, the developer is now tied to the success of
the property; the longer the property holds its value and increases in
value, the more money the developer stands to make. This gives the devel-
oper incentive to build properties that will hold their value for the life of
the PTF covenant.
While PTFs were designed to spread out development costs over mul-
tiple buyers, PTFs may have had the unintended consequence of increas-
ing litigation and closing costs. 120 Because many buyers and sellers do not
know about the existence of PTFs until closing, a property's price might
not be properly negotiated. The surprise of a PTF at closing can result in
lawsuits, failed transactions, and liens being placed on the property.
These lawsuits could be based on fraud, misrepresentation, non-disclo-
sure, or negligence. The uncertainty surrounding the legality of PTFs
could also cause litigants to balk at settlement offers, whether reasonable
or not.12 1
While PTFs are recorded and should be disclosed at closing or before,
it may still be difficult for potential buyers to negotiate an appropriate
price. The buyer will need to know about the PTF's existence and terms,
fully understand the PTF covenant, and adjust the price to account for the
118. SeejoiNT EDITORIAL BD. FOR UNIF. REAL PROP. Acts, POSITION PAPER ON
TRANSFER FEE COVENANTS 6 (2010) [hereinafter POSITION PAPER] (on file with au-
thors) ("Freehold argues that the presence of a 1% transfer fee covenant would
typically result in an offer price that is reduced by 1-2% percent.")
119. See Information for Legislators, FREEHOLD CAPITAL PARTNERS, http://www.
freeholdcapitalpartners.com/information.php?info=legislators (last visited Aug.
11, 2011) ('To the extent the existence of a [transfer] fee impacts the value of
property, as long as the fee is fully disclosed the market will adjust to the fee."
(citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
120. See Harney, supra note 55 (stating that PTFs could lead to increase in
litigation because many buyers and sellers are unaware of existence of PTF
covenants).
121. See id. (stating that uncertainty around PTF covenants may cause buyers
to balk at reasonable settlement offers and may jeopardize property sales).
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covenant's future financial impact.122 However, this can be extremely dif-
ficult for even the most prepared and informed buyer.12 3 The potential
buyer will need to account for a variety of unknown variables, including
how long he or she will hold onto the property, the future value of the
property at the time of the next transfer, and the effect that the PTF will
have on the next potential purchaser.124 With so many variables for a
buyer to take into consideration, it may be difficult to accurately appraise
the value of the property.
C. An Investment Opportunity
In addition to lowering costs for first-time buyers, the revenue stream
created by the PTF can be sold by the developer to create more cash to
reinvest into housing projects.12 5 Because the PTF creates a real property
interest for developers, it is freely assignable and creates increased liquid-
ity for them. This increased liquidity can be used to pay off debts, restart
failed projects, and start new development projects.' 26
Communities may benefit from PTFs when they are designed to be
reinvested into local housing, non-profits, roads, or other valuable com-
munity services. 127 Instead of a one-time payment, the community re-
ceives a long-term stream of cash that can build stronger property values
by increasing income to the community.' 28 In addition, many communi-
ties have used PTFs or similar HOA fees in order to fund community de-
velopment and maintenance projects.' 29
122. See PosITioN PAPER, supra note 118, at 5-6 (listing potential issues of valu-
ing real property encumbered by PTF covenant).
123. See id. (stating that potential buyers cannot accurately gauge monetary
effect of PTF covenants); Freyermuth, supra note 59, at 23 (stating that potential
homebuyers cannot accurately determine monetary effect PTF covenant will have
on real property's future value).
124. See Freyermuth, supra note 59, at 23 (explaining unknown variables that
must be accounted for when determining value of property encumbered by PTF).
125. See McPeak, supra note 31 (asserting that PTFs are real property interests
and are freely assignable); see also FREEHOLD CAPITAL PARTNERS, supra note 16
(claiming that PTF covenants can be bundled, divided, or sold as property right to
investors).
126. See Letter from Micah S. Green to Alfred M. Pollard, supra note 36, at 12
(stating that increased liquidity benefits PTFs provide developers can help these
developers restart stalled projects and start new property development projects).
127. See McPeak, supra note 31 (stating that PTFs are used to encourage af-
fordable housing and benefit non-profits, HOAs, and community services).
128. See id. (explaining that PTFs can build stronger property values by re-
quiring portion of PTF payment to be reinvested in surrounding community).
129. See Kenneth R. Harney, FHFA's Proposed Ban on Private Transfer Fees Could
Cost Homeowners, WASH. PosT, Aug. 21, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/08/20/AR2010082000053.html ("Many new housing
development projects come with not-for-profit homeowners associations that col-
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The property interest that is created by the PTF can be bought and
sold. For example, Freehold uses PTFs as development bonds that can be
packaged into large pools and sold to investors as a future income stream.
However, opponents argue that using PTFs purely for third-party invest-
ments is unethical 30 because PTFs bundled and sold as financial invest-
ments take money away from the homeowner and give a financial benefit
to someone completely disassociated with the real estate transaction.13 1
In response to Freehold's PTF scheme, the Coalition to Stop Wall Street
Home Resale Fees stated that "' [t] hese fees add no benefit or value to a
property, and are little more than a predatory scheme meant to take ad-
vantage of unsuspecting homeowners.'"132
However, gathering property rights into a large financial pool that is
later sold to investors is not a new or unique idea. The federal govern-
ment and private organizations are already engaged in mortgage-backed
securities (MBSs), in which unrelated third parties buy residential prop-
erty interests for purely monetary purposes.' 3 3 PTFs and MBSs are col-
lected and sold to investors in an almost identical manner. The federal
government has consistently supported Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and
Ginnie Mae in order to facilitate the development of MBSs.1 34 However,
in 2011, the Obama Administration announced a proposal that would
phase out Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.135
130. SeeJanet Morrissey, Resale Fees That Only Developers Could Love, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 11, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/12/business/12fees.html?_r-1
&sq=home%20resale%20fee&st=cse&scp=1&pagewanted=all (quoting realtor
Michael Cameron saying that use of PTFs is unethical because it is bad for poten-
tial real property buyers).
131. See Brooke Hunt, Standing Up to Private Transfer Fees, NAT'L Ass'N or REAL-
TORS: VOICES OF REAL ESTATE BLOG (Mar. 3, 2010), http://voicesofreales-
tate.blogs.realtor.org/2010/03/03/standing-up-to-private-transfer-fees-posted-by-
brooke/ (stating PTFs deprive homeowners of affordable housing in order to pro-
vide financial benefit to disinterested third party).
132. Carla Hill, Resale Fees, REALTY TIMES, Oct. 6, 2010, available at http://
realtytimes.com/rtpages/20101006_resalefee.htm (quoting Coalition to Stop Wall
Street Home Resale Fees).
133. See Mortgage-Backed Securities, U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM'N, http://
www.sec.gov/answers/mortgagesecurities.htm (last modified July 23, 2010) (ex-
plaining that residential mortgages, purchased by banks and other entities, are
gathered into pools creating securities that are claims on principle and interest
payments made on mortgages).
134. See id. (indicating that most MBSs are issued by Ginnie Mae and all MBSs
issued by Ginnie Mae are backed by full faith and credit of U.S. government to
ensure timely payments).
135. See Nick Timiraos, Views of Life After Fannie, Freddie, WALL ST. J., Feb 12,
2011, at A5 (stating plans to phase out Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac). Timiraos
writes that "the Obama administration outlined on Friday its plans to begin shrink-
ing the government's broad support of the nation's crippled mortgage market, a
process that officials said could take several years and would include phasing out
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac." Id.
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D. PTFs Provide Financial Flexibility for Commercial Transactions
PTFs can be used in both residential and commercial real estate trans-
actions. In commercial real estate transactions, PTFs would work in the
same manner by lowering the initial selling price of the property. While
this would make investments and purchases more affordable for busi-
nesses, it would also give businesses a higher return on both initial invest-
ment (ROI) and operating income because their initial costs would be
lower.1 3 6 In addition, the lower real property costs would lower carrying
costs for companies, which would also help increase their ROI.1 3 7 The
parties involved in commercial real estate transactions are typically consid-
ered to be more sophisticated and business savvy than the typical residen-
tial purchaser, and they should be granted the freedom of contract to
create and use PTFs in their business transactions. Commercial real estate
transactions occur at arm's length and the parties should be able to deter-
mine the best economic manner in order to finance a real estate transac-
tion without courts second-guessing their business decisions.
V. LEGISLATION PICKS UP SURROUNDING PTF COVENANTS
A. States Legislatures Take PTFs to the Public
As of March 2012, thirty-six states have passed legislation that regu-
lates the use and disclosure of PTFs,1 3 8 and at least another six states are
currently considering legislation.13 9 States are moving quickly to enact
legislation intended to regulate and ban the use of PTF covenants. For
example, bills were introduced and voted on in eight states during
2011.140 However, three very different approaches have been utilized: (1)
136. See FREEHOLD CAPITAL PARTNERS, supra note 16, at 3 ("Capital Recovery
Fees work equally well for commercial property, allowing buyers to defer a portion
of the sales price, thus increasing operating income and ROI.").
137. See id. (stating that combination of lower acquisition costs and lower car-
rying costs equals higher cash flow and higher ROI).
138. See Krepps, supra note 5 (asserting that Pennsylvania was thirty-sixth state
to regulate use of PTF covenants); see also SUSAN STUTZKY & MARK WOLF, A Sum-
MARY OF HOUSE BILLS 4227 AND 4228 AS INTRODUCED 2-10-11, H.B. 4227 & 4228,
2011 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess., at 2 (Mich. 2011), available at https://www.legisla-
ture.mi.gov/documents/2011-2012/billanalysis/House/pdf/201 1-HLA-4227-1.pdf
(stating that as of March 11, 2011, nineteen states had passed legislation regulating
use of PTFs).
139. See Slade Smith, Private Transfer Fee Bans Introduced in at Least Six States,
SOURCE OF TITLE (Jan. 25, 2011), http://www.sourceoftitle.com/article.aspx?uniq=
6587 (stating that Montana, Nebraska, South Dakota, Virginia, Washington, and
Wyoming are considering bans); see also S.B. 146, 62d Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mont.
2011); L.B. 26, 102d Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Neb. 2011); S.B. 70, 86th Legis. Assemb.,
Reg. Sess. (S.D. 2011); S.B. 931, 2011 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2011); S.B.
5115, 62d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2011); H.B. 137, 61st Leg., Gen. Sess. (Wyo.
2011).
140. See Slade Smith, Private Transfer Fee Bans Move Swiftly Through State Legisla-
tures, SOURCE OF TITLE (Feb. 25, 2011), http://www.sourceoftitle.com/article.aspx?
uniq=6630 (setting forth states that have voted on PTF legislations before 2011); see
921
21
Ward and Hopkins: Private Transfer Fees: Developer Exploitation or Legitimate Finan
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2012
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
a complete ban on all new PTF covenants; (2) a requirement of full disclo-
sure of any PTF; and (3) a ban on all new PTF covenants on residential
properties. A complete ban on any newly created PTF covenant has been
the most widely enacted and proposed form of legislation, with fifteen
states enacting such statutes. 1 4 1 However, California only requires full dis-
closure to potential buyers and sellers of the existence of a PTF covenant,
and Hawaii, Mississippi, Colorado, Oregon, and Texas have banned PTFs
in some instances, but not all.
1. Required Public Disclosure of PTFs
California was the first state to see widespread use of PTFs and to put
significant restrictions on their use. In 2008, California adopted Califor-
nia Civil Code sections 1098 and 1098.5, which require pre-sale disclosure
of PTFs. 14 2 Section 1098 describes a transfer fee as a payment of a fee that
is required by a restriction or covenant upon the sale or transfer of real
property. 143 The statute lists nine types of fees that are not considered
transfer fees and are not regulated by the statute:
(a) Fees or taxes imposed by a governmental entity.
(b) Fees pursuant to mechanics' liens.
(c) Fees pursuant to court-ordered transfers, payments, or
judgments.
(d) Fees pursuant to property agreements in connection with a
legal separation or dissolution of marriage.
(e) Fees, charges, or payments in connection with the adminis-
tration of estates or trusts ....
(f) Fees, charges, or payments imposed by lenders or purchasers
of loans ....
(g) Assessments, charges, penalties, or fees authorized by the Da-
vis-Stirling Common Interest Development Act ....
also Slade Smith, Private Transfer Fees Newly Outlawed by Eight States So Far in 2011,
SOURCE OF TrI.E (May 10, 2011), http://www.sourceoftitle.com/article.aspx?uniq
=6722.
141. Arizona, Delaware, Florida, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland,
Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Utah
have all passed bans on PTFs. See ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 33-442 (2010); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 319 (2010); FLA. STAT. § 689.28 (2008); 765 ILL. COMP. STAT.
155/15 (2011); IOWA CODE § 558.48 (2010); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-3821 (2009); LA.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:3133 (2010); MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 10-708 (West
2010); MINN. STAT. § 513.74 (2010); Mo. REv. STAT. § 442.558 (2008); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 46:3-30 (West 2010); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 39A-3 (2010); OHIo REV. CODE.
ANN. § 5301.057 (West 2010); 68 PA. CONs. STAT. § 8104 (2011), UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 57-146 (West 2010),
142. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1098-1098.5 (West 2011).
143. See § 1098 (defining transfer fee for purposes of statute).
[Vol. 56: p. 901922
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(h) Fees, charges, or payments for failing to comply with, or for
transferring the real property prior to satisfying, an obligation to
construct residential improvements on the real property.
(i) Any fee reflected in a document recorded against the prop-
erty on or before December 31, 2007, that is separate from any
covenants, conditions, and restrictions, and that substantially
complies with subdivision (a) of Section 1098.5 by providing a
prospective transferee notice of the following:
(1) Payment of a transfer fee is required.
(2) The amount or method of calculation of the fee.
(3) The date or circumstances under which the transfer fee
payment requirement expires, if any.
(4) The entity to which the fee will be paid.
(5) The general purposes for which the fee will be used.1"4
Section 1098.5 requires that transfer fees created before and after the
passage of the statute must be recorded in a separate document.145 In
order to receive payment of a PTF recorded before the passage of section
1098.5, the fee receiver must record the transfer fee document "against
the real property in the office of the county recorder for the county in
which the real property is located."1 46 In addition, the document must be
entitled "Payment of Transfer Fee Required."1 47 The document must in-
clude a description of the real property and the names of all current own-
ers of the real property subject to the transfer fee.148 The document must
set forth the fee amount or percentage and if it is a residential home there
must be examples of the fee payment for real properties valued at
$250,000, $500,000, and $750,000.149 In addition, the document must set
forth the entity that will be paid, the entity's contact information, and sig-
nature.150 The document must also explain the purpose for which the
funds will be used after they are paid to the entity.' 5 ' Lastly, the docu-
ment must include an explanation of when and how the transfer fee re-
quirements will expire.15 2
144. Id.
145. See §§ 1098.5(a)-(b) (requiring recorded document indicating existence
of PTF covenant in order to provide notice to potential buyers and other inter-
ested parties).
146. § 1098.5 (a).
147. See § 1098.5(a) (1).
148. See§ 1098.5(a)(2)(A).
149. See §§ 1098.5 (a) (2) (B)-(C).
150. See §§ 1098.5(a) (2) (F)-(G).
151. See § 1098.5(a) (2) (E).
152. See § 1098.5 (a) (2) (D).
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The statutory requirements of a transfer fee covenant recorded after
the enactment of the statute are identical except that the person imposing
the transfer fee is required to file the Payment of Transfer Fee Required
document.1 53 California's statute addresses many of the concerns that
were raised by opponents of PTFs. The statute requires disclosure to po-
tential buyers so that there can be no PTF surprises. In addition, the
length and amount of the fee must be detailed and described with real
examples for residential homes. Lastly, the document creates trans-
parency about the entity collecting the PTF and requires the entity to dis-
close how it will use the payment. California's legislation does not ban the
use of PTFs, but instead requires that PTFs are properly recorded so as to
not surprise potential real estate buyers with extra fees upon the purchase
or transfer of real property. While required recordation will put potential
buyers on constructive notice, buyers may still not receive actual notice of
the PTF until closing.
2. States Seek Complete Ban on PTFs
In 2008, Governor Crist of Florida signed into law the first PTF ban in
the United States. 154 The Prohibition Against Private Transfer Fee Cove-
nants (PAPTF) states that PTF covenants violate the public policy of Flor-
ida "by impairing the marketability and transferability of real property and
by constituting an unreasonable restraint on alienation regardless of the
duration of such covenants or the amount of such transfer fees."' 5 5
PAPTF states that PTF covenants recorded after the act do not bind subse-
quent owners of the real property encumbered and that PTF covenants do
not run with the title.1 5 6 However, any PTF covenant that was recorded
before July 1, 2008, in Florida is deemed valid and enforceable.1 5 7
While Florida appeared to ban all future PTF covenants, the defini-
tion and exceptions section of the PAPTF sets forth ten exceptions to the
ban. 158 Fees paid "to a homeowners', condominium, cooperative, mobile
home, or property owners' association," if properly executed through a
binding covenant, are not considered PTFs under the statute.15 9 Addi-
tionally, transfer fees do not include fees that encumber four or more
properties in one community and are paid to a charity or nonprofit, or any
fee that entitles the landowner membership to a club. 16 0 Lastly, the
153. See § 1098.5(b) (indicating there are not any legal distinctions between
PTF covenants in existence before passage of statute and after passage of statute).
154. See FLA. STAT. § 689.28 (2008).
155. § 689.28(1).
156. § 689.28(3).
157. See id. (stating any PTF properly created and recorded before 2008 is still
valid and enforceable).
158. See § 689.28(2) (c) (listing ten scenarios not defined as transfer fee for
purposes of statute).
159. See § 689.28(2) (c) (7).
160. See §§ 689.28(2) (c) (8)-(9).
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PAPTF stated that any transfer fees, taxes, or fines paid to the government
are exempt from the ban.16 1
In September 2008, Missouri passed legislation banning the use of
PTFs.162 Missouri's legislation is very similar to Florida's, except that Mis-
souri does not include all of the exceptions contained in Florida's ban.' 6 3
Missouri's ban does not include the club membership, charity, and HOA
exceptions that Florida's statute exempts from the PTF ban.164
In 2010, Louisiana, Minnesota, and New Jersey all passed legislation
banning the use of PTFs, requiring disclosure of current PTF covenants
and creating penalties for attempting to create or enforce illegal PTFs.1 65
These states have the most comprehensive statutory bans on PTFs. How-
ever, none of these bans are applied retroactively.' 66 This means that
PTFs in these states will continue to be enforceable until their covenants
expire, which in some cases could be up to ninety-nine years.
In 2011, Pennsylvania became the thirty-sixth state to pass legislation
limiting the use of PTF covenants.1 6 7 The Private Transfer Fee Obligation
Act declares that all non-statutorily excluded PTF covenants violate public
policy by impairing the marketability and transferability of real proper-
ties.168 While Pennsylvania excludes PTF covenants where fees are paid to
charities and HOAs, it also excludes some fees paid specifically to licensed
real estate brokers.16 9 Commissions paid to real estate brokers upon the
future transfer of a property that appreciates in value are excluded from
the PTF ban.170 A violation of the Pennsylvania statute may result in liabil-
ity for any damages resulting from the PTF (not limited to the amount of
the fee paid) and any fees or costs associated with an action to quiet
title.17 1
161. See § 689.28 (2) (c) (6).
162. See Mo. REv. STAT § 442.558 (2011).
163. Compare § 442.558 (1) (2), with FLA. STAT. § 689.28 (2) (c).
164. Compare Mo. REv. STAT § 442.558(1) (2) (asserting certain limited excep-
tions to PTF ban), with FLA. STAT. § 689.28(2) (c) (declaring fees paid to charities,
club memberships, and HOAs exempt from PTF ban).
165. See LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:3131-36 (2011); MINN. STAT. §§ 513.73-76
(2011); Assemb. B. 2681, 214th Leg. (N.J. 2010) (enacted) (codified at N.J. STAT.
ANN. §§ 46:3-28 to -33 (West 2011)).
166. See, e.g., LA. REv. STAT. ANN § 9:3136 (stating any PTF created before
passage of bill is still valid and enforceable).
167. See 68 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 8101-07 (2011).
168. See § 8102 (declaring PTFs created after statute void as against public
policy in Pennsylvania).
169. See § 8103 (stating exceptions to Pennsylvania's PTF ban).
170. See id. (excluding from definition of PTF "[a]ny commission payable to a
licensed real estate broker for the transfer of real property pursuant to an agree-
ment between the broker and the grantor or the grantee, including, but not lim-
ited to, any subsequent additional commission for that transfer payable by the
grantor or the grantee based upon any subsequent appreciation, development or
sale of the property").
171. See § 8105.
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While the Pennsylvania statute bans the creation of any new PTF cove-
nants, the statute does not retroactively make PTF covenants illegal.i7 2
Any real property sale subject to a PTF covenant must include a provision
disclosing the existence of the PTF covenant in the sales contract.' 7 3 Con-
sequently, any sales contract that does not include this disclosure and
description is unenforceable by the seller.174 In addition, the statute re-
quires that any existing PTF covenant be recorded "in the office of the
recorder of deeds for each county in which the real property is lo-
cated."' 7 5 Pennsylvania's PTF regulation bans the use of PTF covenants
except in a few select instances and requires upfront disclosure to poten-
tial buyers of any existing PTF covenants in order to protect real property
buyers from unwanted and unknown fees.176
There has been no uniform approach to PTF regulation adopted by
all states; however, PTFs have become a priority issue for both federal and
state governments. Maryland's legislation illustrates the urgency with
which both federal and state governments are giving PTFs. Maryland's bill
banning all new PTFs was passed as an emergency bill.' 77 This means the
bill was necessary for the "immediate preservation of the public health or
safety."17 8 Maryland's legislature argued that "transfer fee covenants vio-
late the public policy by impairing the marketability and transferability of
real property by constituting an unreasonable restraint on alienation.""7 9
The bill stated that PTFs were a new attempt to destroy fee simple estates
without "any right of possession presently or in the future."' 8 0 In addi-
tion, courts have consistently turned back attempts by landowners to cre-
ate new estates in land not traditionally recognized by common law.1 8'
3. States Distinguish Between Residential and Commercial Uses
California's PTF disclosure act was the first state legislation to draw
distinctions between regulations for residential and commercial PTFs.' 8 2
However, in 2010, Mississippi enacted H.B. 886, which prohibits the pay-
172. See § 8104 (stating PTFs in existence prior to statute are "presumed valid
and enforceable").
173. See § 8106 (detailing disclosure requirements and punishment for not
disclosing PTFs when real property is sold).
174. See id.
175. See § 8107(a) (setting forth recording requirements of PTF covenants
with office of recorder of deeds).
176. See §§ 8103, 8104, 8107.
177. See S.B. 666, 2010 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 3 (Md. 2010) (enacted)
(codified at MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 10-708 (West Supp. 2010)) (stating Ma-
ryland bill was enacted as "emergency measure" to protect public).
178. Id. (asserting that passage of PTF covenant regulations was high priority
and was needed in order to protect public).
179. Id. pmbl.
180. Id..
181. See id. (illustrating desire of courts to protect fee simple estates).
182. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1098.5 (West 2011) (identifying specific require-
ments singling out residential properties).
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ment of certain fees for the future conveyance of real residential proper-
ties.18 3 H.B. 886 prohibits a deed restriction or covenant that requires the
"transferee of residential real property" to pay a fee to a third party in
connection with a future transfer of the real property.1 84 In addition,
H.B. 886 specifically states that it does not apply to fees payable to HOAs,
governmental organizations, or 501(c) (3) organizations.18 5 Texas also
passed a legislative ban on PTFs that initially applied only to residential
properties.18 6 Texas Property Code section 5.017 banned the future use
of PTFs in connection with the transfer of residential properties unless the
PTF payment went to a 501(c) (3) organization, the government, or an
HOA that manages a subdivision with more than one residential plot.'8 7
Section 5.017 was later replaced by sections 5.201 to 5.207, which prohibit
all PTFs, not just those encumbering residential property. 8 8
In 2009, Oregon passed legislation banning the use of PTF declara-
tions and covenants.' 8 9 Nevertheless, Oregon's H.B. 2481 only applies to
individual property owners and not to partnerships, LLCs, LLPs, corpora-
tions, or joint ventures.' 90 The Oregon statute keeps individual owners
from placing PTFs on their own houses, but still allows almost all develop-
ers to place PTF covenants on large community projects and commercial
real estate projects.' 9 '
183. See H.B. 886, 2010 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2010) (enacted) (codified at
Miss. CODE ANN. § 89-1-69 (2011)) (enacting statute to prevent "certain covenants
on future conveyances of real property").
184. See id. (prohibiting use of PTF covenants).
185. See id. (indicating certain exceptions were provided by Mississippi legisla-
ture to PTF ban).
186. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 5.017(b) (West 2010) (repealed 2011).
187. See § 5.017(c).
188. See H.B. 8, 82d Leg. Sess. (Tex. 2011) (enacted) (codified as amended at
TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 5.201-07) (repealing § 5.017); see alsoJosh Botts, Transfer
Fee Covenant Comes at a Cost, RPTE EREPORT (Am. Bar Ass'n Section of Real Prop.,
Trust & Estate Law), Oct. 2011, available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/
dam/aba/publications/rpte-ereport/2011/
2011 aba rpte-ereport_05_rp-botts.authcheckdam.pdf (discussing changes to
Texas PTF prohibition). Botts writes that the prohibitions in section 5.017 were
often circumvented
by stating that (1) it only applied to residential situations, and (2) the
term "transferee" meant "one who is acquiring title," referring to a partic-
ular place and time, not to an individual, which meant at the time of a
future sale, the person who originally was the transferee is now the trans-
feror (the person responsible for paying the fee).
Botts, supra, at 1. According to Botts, the changes made in sections 5.201-07 were
intended to resolve the ambiguities of 5.017. See id.
189. See H.B. 2481, 75th Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2009) (enacted) (codi-
fied at OR. REv. STAT. § 93.269 (2009)) (banning PTFs on future transfers of real
property unless otherwise exempted by statute).
190. See OR. REv. STAT. § 93.269 (3).
191. See id. (indicating exemptions to PTF ban, including agreements involv-
ing "a series of related transfers of the fee simple interest in a real property" and
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In 2011, Colorado passed legislation banning any new PTF covenants
recorded on residential properties. 192 Notably, the statute sets forth cer-
tain exemptions from the PTF ban for fees paid to HOAs, charities, and
local governments.1 9 3 In addition, the statute attempts to increase notice
of existing PTF covenants by requiring any party receiving a PTF to record
a notice of the PTF covenant on the property's title. 19 4 Ultimately, Colo-
rado's statute requires more notice for potential buyers and limits some
PTF covenants on residential properties where the fee is not paid to a
party related to the development, maintenance, or improvement of the
real property.19 5
B. Federal Regulation and Legislation Seek PTF Ban
1. Federal Housing Finance Agency Considers Comprehensive Ban
In addition to state laws, the Federal Housing Finance Agency
(FHFA) proposed federal regulations that would restrict government-
owned companies like Freddie Mac, Fannie Mae, and any federal home
loan bank-which currently hold up to ninety percent of all residential
mortgages-from investing in properties encumbered by PTFs.1 9 6 The
FHFA stated that many PTF covenants are not intended to benefit the
community, but rather create purely private streams of income to select
market participants that have nothing to do with the original real estate
transaction.1 9 7 The FHFA stated that it did not find the typical one per-
cent transfer fee to be minimal or reasonable and that PTFs pose a serious
risk to the financial stability of the housing market.1 98 Moreover, the
FHFA believes that all the benefits provided by PTFs can be obtained in
more transparent ways.19 9 However, the FHFA did not offer any sugges-
tions on how the benefits of PTFs could be accomplished in a more trans-
parent manner.
192. See CoLo. REv. STAT. § 38-35-127 (2011) (stating public policy of Colo-
rado requires that residents not be burdened with covenants "that do not touch
and concern residential real property").
193. See §§ 38-35-127(2) (b), 38-35-127(8) (indicating certain exemptions to
PTF ban put in place by Colorado legislature).
194. See § 38-35-127(4) (a) (requiring PTFs existing prior to enactment to reg-
ister with office of county clerk before October 1, 2011).
195. See § 38-35-127 (limiting use of PTF covenants and requiring filed notice
of existence of PTF covenants).
196. See Broderick Perkins, Homeowner Groups: Don't Ban Private Transfer Fees,
CALIFORNIAN, Nov. 5, 2010 (stating that federal government currently holds up to
ninety percent of all residential mortgages).
197. See Private Transfer Fee Covenants, 75 Fed. Reg. 49,932, 49,932 (Aug. 16,
2010) (arguing PTFs are detrimental to homeowners because they often surprise
homeowners with unwanted fees).
198. See id. at 49,933. (stating PTFs are unreasonable and pose significant risk
to stability of housing market).
199. See id. (stating opponents argue benefits of PTFs can be obtained in
more transparent ways).
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The FHFA voiced multiple reasons why PTFs should be regulated.2 w
For example, the FHFA argued that PTFs increase the costs of home own-
ership, limit property transfers, detract from the stability of the secondary
mortgage market, expose market participants to unknown risks or liens,
contribute to reduced transparency, increase last-minute real estate costs,
and complicate residential home transactions.2 0 1 Because of the potential
risks associated with PTFs, the FHFA proposed that Fannie Mae and Fred-
die Mac "should not purchase or invest in any mortgages encumbered by
private transfer fee covenants or securities backed by such mortgages."20 2
The FHFA's proposed rule would "ban Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
from purchasing any loan on a house, townhouse or condominium with a
deed-based transfer fee, which is recorded along with the title and binding
on subsequent purchasers, often for as long as 99 years." 20 However, the
FHFA's proposed ban of PTFs would not only limit the use of PTFs, but
would also limit other types of fees commonly associated with real proper-
ties, 20 4 such as payments to HOAs, affordable housing groups, and com-
munity organizations.20 5 The Community Association Institute argues
that the FHFA's proposed ban would ensnare community associations that
have effectively used PTFs for decades and would cause an increase in an-
nual assessments to individual property owners. 206 The period for public
comments on the FHFA closed on October 15, 2010, after being open for
sixty days.20 7
On February 1, 2011, the FHFA announced that it was moving for-
ward with its formal rulemaking process with regards to banning federally
backed mortgages on properties encumbered by PTFs.208 The previously
proposed guidance was amended to take into consideration comments
200. See id. (listing multiple reasons to ban use of PTFs).
201. See id.
202. Id. at 49,934.
203. Lew Sichelman, FHFA's Proposed Private Transfer Fee Ban 'Goes Too Far',
NAT'L MORTG. NEWS, Oct. 11, 2010, at 6, 6 (detailing FHFA's proposed ban on
PTFs).
204. See id. (explaining that FHFA's proposed ban on PTFs would ban variety
of other legitimate transfer fees).
205. See Harney, supra note 129 ("The wording of the ban, however, appears
to reach well beyond Freehold-type fees to include mortgages where covenants
require payments to homeowners associations, affordable housing groups, or other
community or nonprofit organizations upon each resale of the property.").
206. See Sichelman, supra note 204 (arguing that complete ban on PTFs
would harm HOAs).
207. See Press Release, Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, FHFA Proposes Guidance to
Restrict GSEs from Investing in Mortgages with Private Transfer Fee Covenants
(Aug. 12, 2010), available at http://www.fhfa.gov/webfiles/16480/PrivTrans-
FeeGuidance081210.pdf (setting forth timeline for FHFA's proposed PTF gui-
dance and regulations).
208. See Press Release, supra note 6 (stating FHFA would move forward with its
regulation limiting government-backed banks from dealing with properties en-
cumbered by PTF covenants).
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and concerns received by the FHFA.2 09 The FHFA's proposed rules
"would limit Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the Federal Home Loan Banks
from dealing in mortgages on properties encumbered by certain types of
private transfer fee covenants." 210 The newly amended rule would exempt
PTFs paid to HOAs, condominiums, cooperatives, and tax-exempt organi-
zations that use the fee to directly benefit the property. 211
2. Federal Legislation at a Cross Road
In addition to state laws and the proposed FHFA guidelines, Congress
is currently considering legislation that would outlaw PTFs at the federal
level. While multiple PTF bills were considered in 2010, none were en-
acted, and it is still unclear if any federal legislation will be passed in 2011.
On September 29, 2010, H.R. 6260-sponsored by Representative Maxine
Waters-was introduced in the House of Representatives. 212 H.R. 6260,
the Home Equity Protection Act of 2010, was referred to the House Finan-
cial Services Committee for further investigation and review. 2 13 As pro-
posed, H.R. 6260 would prohibit the use of PTFs and PTF covenants on all
federally collected mortgages. 2 14 In support of the proposed PTF legisla-
tion, Congressman Albio Sires stated that PTFs are dangerous to the hous-
ing market and that the federal government "need [s] to protect
consumers from these corporate practices on a federal level."21 5
In addition to an overall ban on the use of PTFs, Congress is also
considering another bill that would require increased transparency for
PTF covenants. Representative Phil Gingrey introduced H.R. 6332, the
Homebuyer Enhanced Fee Disclosure Act of 2010, which would require
increased disclosures to buyers and require PTFs to be properly labeled
and recorded with the real property's title. 2 16 The House Committee on
Financial Services is currently reviewing the bill. With both of the major
bills on PTFs in the House Committee on Financial Services, a decision by
209. See id. (indicating FHFA updated guidance based on comments received
on previous guidance by excluding fees paid to HOAs and other similar
organizations).
210. Id.
211. See id. (indicating PTFs have beneficial uses in certain situations).
212. See Homeowner Equity Protection Act of 2010, H.R. 6260, 111th Cong.
(2d Sess. 2010) (proposing ban on PTFs for federally backed mortgages).
213. See id.
214. See id. (stating transfer fees are illegal after effective date of legislation on
federally related mortgage loans).
215. See Press Release, Office of Congressman Albio Sires, Sires Cosponsors
Bill to Ban Private Transfer Fees (Sept. 29, 2010), available at http://sires.house.
gov/index.php?option=com-content&view=article&id=569:9292010-sires-cospon-
sors-bill-to-ban-private-transfer-fees&catid=33:2010-press-releases&Itemid=107 (as-
serting federal legislation is needed in order to regulate PTF covenants).
216. See Homebuyer Enhanced Fee Disclosure Act of 2010, H.R. 6332, 111th
Cong. (2d Sess. 2010) (proposing federal legislation to require increased disclo-
sure and recording of PTFs).
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that committee could decide the future of PTFs covenants. Currently, it
appears unlikely that either of these bills will be passed into law.
C. Model Legislation
PTF covenants are contractual agreements that two or more parties
agree on and enter into for the future payment of a fee upon the transfer
of real property. PTFs, when properly recorded and disclosed, can pro-
vide benefits to all parties of the contract. However, a potential
homebuyer might overpay for the property if the PTF is not timely dis-
closed to the buyer. As previously discussed, if the buyer does not find out
about the PTF until after signing a purchase agreement or until closing,
the buyer could be at a disadvantage in the real estate transaction because
the buyer would have already invested significant time and money into the
transaction and become contractually obligated, without actual knowledge
of a potentially burdensome PTF. Further, the buyer would not be able to
effectively negotiate the sales price to take into consideration the PTF.
While a complete ban on PTFs would eventually ease many of these
problems, there are still currently an estimated 11 to 12 million homes
encumbered by PTFs. 217 A complete ban on PTFs could have unintended
consequences on these still-encumbered homes. Many of these homes will
continue to be bound by PTF covenants for up to ninety-nine years. In
addition, a complete ban would deprive developers, potential buyers,
HOAs, non-profits, and businesses of their freedom of contract and a use-
ful financial tool.
Instead of a complete ban on PTFs, adopting and amending Califor-
nia Civil Code sections 1098 and 1098.5 as model legislation would ensure
that all PTF covenants are recorded, clearly identified, and timely dis-
closed to potential buyers. While sections 1098 and 1098.5 do a decent
job of creating constructive notice for potential buyers by requiring that
all PTF covenants are clearly identified and recorded with the county re-
corder, the provisions do a poor job of solving the issue of actual notice.
The statute should be amended to include a section that requires all real
property listings to include a disclosure of the PTF covenant, its stated
amount, and its duration. Sellers and sellers' agents should be required to
provide prospective buyers with a separate "Payment of Transfer Free Re-
quired" document, signed by the buyer as an acknowledgement of receipt.
This requirement would provide important consumer protections to po-
tential buyers before the signing of a purchase agreement, increase PTF
transparency, and preserve a valuable financial mechanism for developers,
HOAs, non-profits, and businesses without impeding on their freedom of
217. See Broderick Perkins, CAl, CPCF: Don't Ban Private Transfer Fees, ExAm-
INER.COM (Oct. 28, 2010), http://www.examiner.com/real-estate-news-in-national/
cai-cpcf-don-t-ban-private-transfer-fees ("Banning private transfer fees on home
sales could dam up the sale of some 11 to 12 million properties, according to a
major homeowner association group and a new coalition supporting the fees.").
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contract. Failure to comply with the proposed statute would permit the
buyer to rescind the purchase agreement, recover all funds advanced to
the seller or seller's agent, and be reimbursed for any and all of the
buyer's costs, such as a home inspection fee.
VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
PTFs already encumber billions of dollars of real estate; they will not
be going away anytime soon, even if they are uniformly banned by federal
regulations or legislation. However, the current trend is for states to ban
the use of PTF covenants in new contracts while requiring full disclosure
of existing PTF obligations. Changes to federal laws regarding PTFs are
likely coming, with multiple bills under consideration in Congress and
proposed regulations by the FHFA pending. However, it is unclear
whether or not the federal government will go the path of banning PTFs
or requiring full disclosure of PTF covenants.
PTFs are not an inherently bad financing tool. However, PTFs do
lower the price of real property and this can have negative consequences
for a potential buyer if the buyer is not made aware of the PTF in a timely
manner. If the PTF covenant is not disclosed to the buyer before closing,
the buyer will have already put significant time, money, and effort into the
real estate transaction. The buyer will likely have signed a contract for the
sale of the property and will not have been able to properly negotiate the
real property's price in order to take into account the PTF.
Buyers need to know about the PTF covenant in a timely manner in
order to effectively negotiate the sales price and complete the real estate
transaction. While a full ban on PTFs would eliminate this problem, it can
also be eliminated in a less burdensome manner. A full ban on PTFs may
harm HOAs, non-profits, and a variety of other community associations
currently relying on PTF payments. Failure to disclose in a timely, clear,
and concise manner should give the buyer a right of recision, create a
cause of action for the buyer for all costs and funds advanced to the seller
or seller's agents, and discharge the buyer to any parties under the
purchase agreement including the realtor. PTFs should be disclosed in
the listing of the real estate along with other material information such as
property taxes and fees. In addition, the seller and seller's agents should
be required to provide prospective buyers with a separate document-Pay-
ment of Transfer Free Required-signed by the buyer as an acknowledge-
ment of receipt. This would inform the buyer about the PTF with
adequate time to negotiate the price.
PTF covenants are contracts between the initial buyer and property
developer that run with the land for a determined length of time. These
covenants can provide flexible financing to both the developer and buyer.
The buyer is able to pay less money up front and the developer is able to
attain a future income stream and interest in the property. In conclusion,
PTFs are a reasonable financing vehicle that can bring about long-term
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economic stability to communities, lower housing costs, increase finances
available for community improvements, increase housing values in the
long-run, and provide potential packages for investors. However, the ben-
efits of PTFs are only acceptable if a buyer has actual notice of a PTF prior
to executing a purchase agreement.
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